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1. Introduction 
Spain, as part of the EU, has ratified the Kyoto protocol, which aims at reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions in industrialised countries by 2008-12. Though the burden sharing agreement within EU 
allows Spain to increase emissions by 15% in this period compared to the 1990 level, a fulfilment of 
the commitment will require significant reductions compared to a business-as-usual scenario. In fact, 
by having increased the carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions by 39.4% from 1990 to 2002, Spain's 
deviation from EU's intermediate emission goals was more serious than for most other EU countries; 
see European Environment Agency (2004).  As part of the EU emission permit program Spain has 
introduced revenue-raising emission permits from 2005. There is deep concern for the social costs of 
such measures. In particular, the debate has focused on the consequences in terms of lost 
competitiveness and subsequent unemployment. The unemployment problems have been severe since 
the last part of the 1970s. By the mid 1980s and also by the mid 1990s, the unemployment rate 
exceeded 20%. In 2002, the average rate had decreased to 11%, with the rate among unskilled labour 
being the double of that of skilled. Still, this is among the highest unemployment rates in the EU. 
These facts make Spain special in a European context, and call for detailed studies of this country and 
its institutions in order to address the economic consequences of carbon policies. 
 
Our aim is to explore whether an auction system for emissions permits is likely to accentuate Spain's 
serious unemployment problem and how the recycling of sales revenue should be targeted in order to 
counteract the unemployment effects as effectively as possible. The literature has extensively 
addressed the possibilities of a double dividend from green policies, i.e. economic gains in addition to 
environmental benefits that may entirely (strong dividends) or partly (weak dividends) offset the costs 
caused by introducing green tax wedges (Goulder, 1995). Welfare dividends may occur if introducing 
green taxes or, equivalently, a free market for emission quotas, moderates the welfare losses of other, 
existing, distortionary taxes, or it may be obtained by using revenues from the green taxation to reduce 
such tax wedges. For a recent survey, see Schöb (2003). Dividends in terms of employment have also 
been much in focus, especially in the European debate. Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) discuss 
the theoretical ambiguity of the scope of employment dividends of emission taxes in presence of 
structural unemployment, unemployment benefits, endogenous labour supply and revenue recycling. 
Mors (1995), Majocchi (1996), and Bosquet (2000) all survey quantitative studies, mainly for the EU 
countries. The costs of green policies are likely to reduce overall economic activity and increase 
unemployment, unless tax revenues can be targeted towards cutting distortionary taxes on labour. The 
general empirical conclusion is that there seems to be positive, though small, employment effects of 
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shifting taxes from labour to energy/environment. There is also some evidence of higher employment 
dividends if measures are targeted to the low skilled. The reasons are that both demand and supply 
tend to be more elastic in case of unskilled labour. Such a reform was originally proposed as a solution 
to the European unemployment problem in Dréze and Malinvaud (1994). However, in a Computable 
General Equilibrium (CGE) analysis where the EU markets for skilled and unskilled labour are 
separated, Bosello and Carraro (2001) conclude that the employment effects are larger when taxes are 
reduced for all labour rather than for the low skilled, only. As this question is of special interest for 
Spain, in light of the distributional aspects of the extraordinarily high unemployment of low skilled 
workers, we include these two proposals in our study. In addition, we supply the analysis with 
examinations of two other schemes: Recycling revenue through reduced VAT rates and through pay 
roll taxes on skilled labour. In light of the pessimistic employment results in Bosello and Carraro 
(2001) of targeting to low skilled labour, targeting to the relatively skilled is a natural follow-up 
research issue. 
 
The tendency in the vast model literature on the double dividend issue is to study welfare effects in a 
CGE framework that leaves out labour market imperfections, while addressing employment effects in 
shorter-term econometric models with no consistent measure of welfare changes. In fact, the welfare 
and employment effects are highly interlinked. Results on employment are important determinants for 
the welfare results, both because unemployment represents waste of resources and because high labour 
taxes tend to generate too strong incentives for (voluntarily) devoting time to leisure (Bye, 2000). The 
aim of this paper is to measure welfare and employment effects for the Spanish economy within a 
consistent framework, by applying a CGE model that incorporates the specific labour market 
characteristics of Spain. Such a combined approach is rare in the literature, and though integrated 
models of the EU as an entity have been applied (Carraro et al., 1996), the outstanding Spanish case, 
in detail, is still not addressed. 
 
The scope for employment dividends, as well as welfare dividends, depends on the features of the 
labour markets, in particular their flexibility and wage formation. In many respects Spain's labour 
market institutions and unemployment problems are special. Dolado et al. (1998) stress the relatively 
high weight of unskilled unemployment in Spain compared to the EU average. Blanchard et al. (1995) 
identify the main reasons for the high unemployment to be the collective structure of wage bargaining 
combined with high employment protection for part of the labour force. Bover et al. (2000) also 
emphasise the role of generous unemployment benefits. In addition, there are large regional 
unemployment differences, due to a relatively low mobility of labour across regions. Another common 
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argument is that large wedges between take-home pay and the cost of labour hamper employment. 
Payroll taxes are high in Spain (see, e.g., Bajo and Gómez-Plana, 1999), and lowering the wedges may 
reduce labour costs and encourage Spanish employment.  
 
We represent the mechanisms of the Spanish labour market as matching processes and distinguish 
between skilled and unskilled workers, due to important differences in supply and demand, and thus in 
policy responses. The labour supply is endogenous, and we separate between employment effects from 
adjusted supply behaviour and from changes in the number of unemployed, respectively.  
 
Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1998) show that the potential for a double dividend would depend on 
various elements that can be defined in a matching function. Matching processes and mismatch seem 
to describe the Spanish labour markets well, as there is a highly intensive matching process. In 1996, 
there were more than 8.5 million hires out of a labour force of 16 millions (Castillo et al., 1998). This 
is mainly due to a high number of workers hired under fixed-term contracts (31.7% in 2001 while the 
EU average was 13.4%). These contracts are most prominent among less educated (Toharia, 1996). 
Low geographical mobility also causes a significant mismatch problem. Matching models can, as well, 
represent the frictions caused by presence of labour unions. Bosello and Carraro (2001) model the 
labour market based on assumptions on union bargaining power. This is a good approach for some 
European countries, but as the Spanish labour market is characterised by a gap between a very low 
unionisation rate and the bargaining coverage rate (Blau and Kahn, 1999, p. 1418), the union 
bargaining power approach is less suitable for Spain. We follow the matching specification in 
Balistreri (2002), which is a new way of introducing equilibrium unemployment in CGE models. Our 
model also takes into account that market power is prevalent in several Spanish industries, not least in 
the emission-intensive productions of energy and of transportation (Huergo, 1998). We quantify the 
impact of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale on the results.  
 
Our results are encouraging with respect to the social costs of restricting CO2 emissions. The 
aggregate unemployment effects of pricing Spanish CO2 emissions are minor, as only a small fraction 
of the labour force is employed in the most affected industries. Moreover, if sales revenue is targeted 
to cut labour taxation, unemployment falls. This is especially true if direct, rather than indirect, labour 
taxation is reduced. The best option is to reduce payroll taxes on skilled employment. This reform is 
the most successful both in increasing demand and in dampening the supply response to rising wages. 
However, from a distributional point of view it is less attractive, as the unemployment rate for the 
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unskilled increase. All the recycling schemes generate dividends in terms of welfare, but none offset 
the abatement costs entirely.   
2. Method 
2.1 The design of the analysis 
We perform our analysis based on simulations on a large-scale CGE model for the Spanish economy. 
Employment dividends are defined in terms of unemployment rate reductions rather than employment 
formation. Changes in employment, which are also reported, partly arise from voluntary labour supply 
adjustments, partly from involuntary unemployment changes. Even though both mechanisms have 
relevance to the welfare effects we analyse, we attach particular interest to the unemployment 
phenomenon in itself, due to its distributional and socio-psychological aspects. The employment and 
welfare dividends are addressed by simulating reductions in the number of emission permits from the 
benchmark level. We present the results of 25 percent reductions.1 The benchmark price for permits is 
zero, but when permits become scarce, firms begin to bid for them and the price increases. This can be 
interpreted as an open auction of permits with a uniform price (or equivalently, carbon taxation).  
 
We simulate five revenue-recycling alternatives: 
 Case A: Lumpsum transfers to households,  
 Case B: Reduced payroll tax rates for all labour, irrespective of skill levels,  
 Case C: Reduced indirect taxes, exemplified by the VAT rates.  
 Case D: Reduced payroll taxes exclusively for unskilled labour. 
 Case E: Reduced payroll taxes exclusively for the skilled.  
 
As lumpsum recycling is, by definition, undistortionary, the simulation in Case A is useful for 
cultivating the pure effects of introducing a price on emissions (the pure abatement effects). 
Comparing the other, more policy-relevant, recycling cases with Case A enables us to isolate the 
contributions of the recycling schemes (the recycling effects). Comparing the different revenue 
recycling schemes in Cases B, C, D and E will illuminate how recycling should be directed in order to 
minimise unemployment and reveal to what extent the reforms are associated with tradeoffs between 
welfare and employment dividends.  
                                                     
1 Smaller, as well as larger, reductions show the same qualitative results, and all variables react smoothly to the variations in 
emission restrictions.  
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We close the analysis by investigating the sensitivity of our results to model characteristics and 
parameter assumptions. First, we identify how the assumptions of imperfect competition and 
increasing returns to scale matter by comparing the results with corresponding results from a constant 
returns to scale model with perfect competition. While many CGE models used in the double dividend 
literature assume constant returns to scale, much empirical work casts doubt on this assumption. 
Second, we test the sensitivity of our results to different estimates of the externality parameters in the 
labour market matching functions, which should be considered uncertain. We compare the outcome of 
using deviating estimates from two Spanish studies, Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and Castillo et al. 
(1998). Finally, we perform a simple test of the impact of our imperfect labour market assumptions. 
 
In order to give a better intuition and be able to decompose the results of the large-scale model, a 
stylised, reduced form of the model is also presented. The miniature model reflects the major 
mechanisms in the large model and makes them more transparent. The main characteristics of the 
numerical model are outlined in section 2.2. For details see Appendices 1, 2, and 3. Section 2.3 derives 
the miniature model and visualises it in a two-equation diagram.   
2.2 The numerical model 
The numerical model is a static CGE model, where the main refinements are made in order to capture 
the relevant welfare and employment outcomes for the Spanish economy of changes in carbon policy 
and labour taxation. In particular, the model incorporates important features of the Spanish imperfect 
labour markets, a comprehensive description of the existing tax structure, imperfect competition and 
other distortionary wedges within the Spanish economy, as well as disaggregate structures of 
household utility, production and factor use, in order to represent relevant substitution possibilities 
decisive to the policy responses. The model also computes CO2 emissions on a detailed level both 
from firms and households.  
 
Spain is modelled as a small, open economy. Goods are differentiated by origin (domestic and 
foreign), according to the Armington assumption. The balances of trade and financial cross-border 
flows are fixed. This avoids continuous net capital flows in or out of the country. All agents, except 
the public sector, have optimising behaviour. The aim of the public sector is to balance revenues 
according to an exogenous restriction, which we keep constant, i.e. all policy changes are revenue 
neutral. A macroeconomic restriction fixes public investment and deficit (or surplus), implying that 
public savings are, as well, fixed. Revenues from market sales of CO2 permits are included in the 
public income.  
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Primary factor endowments are given and mobile across industries, and factor markets clear by 
adjustments in factor prices. However, the fact that labour markets far from clear in the Spanish 
economy is taken care of by allowing for equilibrium unemployment (see below). In macro, savings 
are fixed, and investments and savings balance.  
 
In order to model that market power is prevalent in several Spanish industries, the degree of 
competition is allowed to vary among industries, according to the degree of firm concentration: High 
concentration (high Herfindahl indexes) corresponds to less competitive sectors. The higher 
concentration, the higher mark-ups. This pricing rule is based on profit maximisation, price-elastic 
demand functions and Cournot competition, i.e., firms take the supply of the others as given when 
deciding their own production. All firms within an industry are identical. Technologies exhibit 
increasing returns to scale due to the existence of some fixed labour and capital costs. There is free 
entry and exit of firms in each sector, so that in equilibrium price equals average costs, inclusive of the 
fixed costs.  
 
Defining the mark-up as the price-cost margin (P-MC)/P = MARKUP, and using that, in equilibrium, 
price is equal to average cost (P = AC), we find that MC/(1-MARKUP) = AC. This mark-up is 
specified as follows: 
 
(1) MARKUPi = ΩiEiκ id , i=1,…,16 
 
This is the Lerner index for sector i, and depends on three variables: The conjectural variations 
parameter Ω i  (in our case: Ω i= 12), the perceived elasticity of demand faced by sector i (κid ), and the 
share of a typical firm in sector i's output, that is equal to the inverse of the number of firms in each 
sector (1/E i). This share can be proxied in the benchmark by the Herfindahl index (see Appendix 3), 
under the assumption of symmetric firms in each sector.  
 
The production sector is specified by 16 industries (see Table 1). Firms maximise profits subject to a 
production technology characterised by a detailed, nested structure (see Figure 1). CO2 emissions from 
firms originate from the use of fossil energy as input factors. In our static framework, investments 
show their influence on the economy as a component of final demand. Private households are assumed 
                                                     
2 Usually conjectural variation is defined so that it is equal to zero with Cournot competition. However, here the conjectural 
variation parameter is normalized to unity.   
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to share homothetic and identical preferences. Hence, they can be represented by a single, 
representative household. The household maximises a nested welfare function (see Figure 2) by 
choosing savings3, leisure, and consumption of goods (including energy). The household generates 
CO2 emissions when it consumes coal, oil and gas. However, the quality of the environment is not 
specified in the welfare function. Endowments of capital, as well as skilled and unskilled labour, are 
fixed. The labour supply  is elastic up to these fixed maximum amounts. This feature of the model 
enables us to analyse to what extent adjustments of labour supply explain changes in the 
unemployment rates. 
 
Based on Balistreri (2002), we assume a case of equilibrium unemployment, inspired by a matching 
specification and the theory of external economies (see, e.g., Markusen, 1990). A matching function 
gives the number of jobs formed as a function of the number of workers looking for a job 
(unemployed), and the number of firms looking for workers (vacancies); see Petrongolo and Pissarides 
(2001) for a recent survey of the matching function in macroeconomics. With this approach, frictions 
due to lack of information, immobility, search costs, heterogeneities across workers and jobs, etc. can 
explain the existence of unemployment or vacancies. Following Balistreri, we model frictions by 
assuming that workers have to spend some resources in finding a job, so the search process is costly. 
We assume that all search costs are borne by the workers. This means that real received wages, net of 
taxes, Wj, include a premium (
1
H j
> 1) on reservation wages (Wj0) that represents search costs: 
 
(2)  W j = W0j 1H j , j = s,us , where s = skilled,  us= unskilled workers. 
 
Another feature of Balistreri’s approach is externalities. The unemployed views the search cost as 
given. However, the risk of not being matched, represented by the search cost, is affected by the 
behaviour of all other agents. If, for instance, the labour market expands, labour demand increases and 
the cost of participating in the market falls; it is easier to find a job. If the unemployment rate 
increases, vacancy congestion decreases and the matching process eases. We model this by assuming 
that the H-functions (inverse premium) has properties similar to matching functions: 
 
                                                     
3 Given our static approach, we consider a unitary elasticity of substitution between consumption and savings (see Howe, 
1975). Savings can be interpreted as the purchase of bonds for future consumption.   
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(3)  H j = 1−U j( ) LD j
LD j
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
η 0 U j
U j
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
η 1
, j = s,us ,  
 
where a bar denotes a benchmark value for the referred variable, LD is aggregate demand for labour 
and U is the unemployment rate. H is increasing in LD and U, i.e., the search cost is decreasing in the 
same variables. Following Balistreri (2002), vacancies are, for simplicity, absent in this model, and 
labour demand is used as a proxy. This means that total employment follows the labour demand curve. 
η0 is the elasticity with respect to vacancies. It measures the positive externality caused by firms on 
searching workers, here represented by a lower search cost. η1 is the elasticity with respect to 
unemployment and measures the positive externality from workers to firms. 
 
The model is solved through Rutherford's (1999) method, which treats general equilibrium models as 
mixed complementarity problems following Mathiesen (1985), and it is implemented with 
GAMS/MPSGE. It has been calibrated using the Spanish Social Accounting Matrix for 1990, MCS-
90, developed in Uriel et al. (1997) and Gómez-Plana (2001), as the reference equilibrium. Elasticities 
are taken from available empirical evidence. See Appendix 3 for more information on calibration and 
data.  
2.3. A stylised, reduced-form miniature model 
As a tool for the analysis of the results stemming from the full, numerical model simulations in the 
next section, we use a reduced-form, less specified representation of the model. Large-scale models 
may often appear as black boxes when explaining results. The miniature model reflects the major 
mechanisms in the large model and makes them more transparent. It suppresses many details of the 
larger model, for instance, there is only one labour market and  one product market. It also suppresses 
the search cost function..4  In eqs. (4) to (7) the equilibrium of the stylised model is expressed by only 
four equations, the labour market equilibrium, the trade balance, the indirect welfare function and the 
capital market equilibrium. All other equations and equilibrium conditions, such as the product market 
equilibrium and the revenue neutrality constraint of the public budget, are implicitly defined:5 
 
                                                     
4 Including it would provide a separate determination of the two components of the wage rate, reservation wage and search 
costs (see eq. 2), and clarify the more complicated relationship between the wage and unemployment determination. But 
signs would not change. See also footnote 11. 
5 A detailed presentation of the stylised model and its reduction into four equations is available from the authors on request. 
See also Fæhn and Grünfeld (1999) for a more extensive presentation of a similar procedure, inspired by Holmøy (1992).  
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(4) LS(W, R, U; ε)(1-U)=LD*{W, R, ε, X[W, R, ε, Qcg(W, R, U; ε)]}= LD(W, R, U; ε)  
 
(5) D =D*{W, R, ε, Qcg(W, R, U; ε)}= D(W, R, U; ε)  
 
(6) WF = WF*{Qcg(W, R, U; ε), LS(W, R, U; ε)}  =WF(W, R, U; ε) 
 
(7) K  =KD*{W, R, ε, X[W, R, ε, Qcg(W, R, U; ε)]}= KD(W, R, U; ε) 
 
Notation6: 
LS= labour supply  
LD= labour demand  
W=  the labour rent/the wage rate  
R=  the capital rent/the user cost of capital  
U= the unemployment rate 
ε= vector of all exogenous variables 
X=  domestic output 
Qcg = demand for aggregate consumption of goods 
D = fixed trade balance 
WF =  welfare    
K = fixed total capital  
KD= capital demand 
 
Eq. (4) represents the unemployment-adjusted labour market equilibrium, corresponding to eqs. (A6) 
and (A7) of the numerical model.7 It distinguishes between five effects of changes in the endogenous 
W, R and, U, and ε, which includes exogenous reform components like tax rates and emission 
restrictions (determining the quota price; see eq. (A31)): 
(i) Substitution effects: The first appearance of W, R and ε in the LD*- function represents changes in 
relative labour to capital demand of altering wages, capital rents and exogenous variables.  
                                                     
6 Note that a star after a symbol represents a different functional form, e.g. WF*(.) and WF(.) are two different functional 
forms expressing the variable WF.  
7 All equations of the full model are listed in Appendix 2. See also Appendix 1 for the notation of the model. 
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(ii) Competitiveness effects: W, R and ε also affect labour demand through altering production costs 
and thus the international competitiveness of Spanish firms. This alters output (X) and subsequent 
input of labour.  
(iii) Home market effects: X also depends on the domestic demand for the final good, Qcg, which is a 
determined by prices and income. These are functions of factor prices, the unemployment rate that 
first of all affects the income of the aggregate household, as well as exogenous variables.  
(iv) Labour supply effects: Left hand side of eq. (4) shows that through the household’s decisions, 
labour supply is dependent on the same price and income determinants as the demand for final goods 
described above.  
(v) Unemployment wedge effect: The term (1-U) captures that the unemployment rate influences the 
labour market equilibrium directly. 
 
The net current account is restricted through fixing the trade balance to D , as in eq. (5). This 
corresponds to eq. (A.37) in Appendix 2. Eq. (5) distinguishes between two channels, through which 
the endogenous and exogenous variables influence the current account:  
(vi) Competitiveness effects: The current account restriction responds to cost changes that alter the 
competitiveness of Spanish firms, and thus imports and exports.  
(vii) Home market effects: Effects of changes in the domestic final consumption, Qcg comes through 
import leakages. 
 
Eq. (6) defines welfare as a function of the utility of demanded consumption goods, Qcg, including 
savings, and demanded leisure, which is implicitly a function of labour supply, LS (see eqs. (A17) and 
(A20)). The determinations of Qcg and LS are explained above.  
 
Equilibrium capital demand, KD, is restricted to the given capital stock, K . As eq. (A5) of the 
numerical model, eq. (7) ensures this. Analogous to the labour demand, capital demand is influenced 
by Substitution effects, Competitiveness effects and Home market effects.  
 
The four equations solve for the four endogenous variables WF, W, R and U. We can reduce the model 
further, by solving eq. (6) for W, eq. (7) for R, and then inserting the latter into the former. For a given 
ε, W and R are determined by WF and U: 
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(6'): W=W(WF, U; ε) 
 
(7'):  R=R*(W, U; ε)= R(WF, U; ε) 
 
Using eqs. (6') and (7') leaves us with the labour market equilibrium and the current account expressed 
in eqs. (4) and (5) as functions of only two endogenous variables, WF and U, which again implicitly 
determine all other variables in the model. The benefit of a two-equation model is that it can be easily 
visualised, as in Figure 3. It is important to notice and keep in mind in the analyses in Section 3, that 
through eqs. (6') and (7') all the effects of endogenous changes in WF work through the factor prices in 
eqs. (4) and (5). For given U, increased WF must involve factor price increases (from now on 
represented by the nominal wage rate, W). 8 Analogously, many of the effects of U-changes also take 
place via changing factor prices. However, contrary to WF, U also influences eqs. (4) and (5) directly. 
It has an independent impact on the (iii) Home market effects in eqs. (4) and (5), and (iv) Labour 
supply effects in eq. (4), and finally has the (v) unemployment wedge effect in eq. (4). In spite of the 
various effects via the factor prices, we have chosen WF and U as the remaining endogenous variables 
in the analysis, simply because they directly give us the resulting welfare and employment dividends 
that our shift analyses of CO2 policy reforms and revenue recycling schemes focus on.  
 
In Figure 3, the LL0-locus and the DD0-locus are defined as the combinations of WF and U that for the 
exogenous benchmark values, ε0, fulfil eqs. (4) and (5), respectively. Where both conditions are 
fulfilled we find the equilibrium solution of the model in the benchmark case, i.e. in the intersection 
coordinate (WF0, U0). Both the slopes of the loci, as well as shift effects of exogenous reforms will 
depend on the relative strengths within the Spanish economy of the mechanisms i) to vii) described 
above.  
 
The slopes express the necessary change in U for different, exogenous shifts in WF, keeping, 
respectively, the labour market equilibrium and the trade balance intact. They are identified by means 
of simulations of the numerical model9. To start with the LL locus, its positive slope implies that a 
                                                     
8 Simulations on the numerical model show that the strongest impact of WF on factor prices comes through the indirect utility 
expressed by eq. (6): A rise in WF will have to involve real income improvements, and for given U, factor price increases 
must take place. The simulations show that a partial rise in WF causes wages to increase relatively more than capital rents, 
and nominal wages more than the prices of consumption goods so that the real wages increase. In the following we suppress 
the effects on capital rents, as they only work to dampen the conclusions from a discussion focusing on nominal (and real) 
wages. 
9 For simplicity, in these simulations the labour market has been merged into one in the numerical model, in order to operate 
with only one aggregate unemployment rate, wage rate etc. 
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distortion in the labour market equilibrium resulting from a given relative increase in WF will have to 
be neutralised by a simultaneous increase in U. The explanation is that increased WF, in isolation, 
creates a labour demand deficit in the Spanish economy, while an increase in U creates a surplus, 
which rebalances the labour market. In other words, moving rightwards and/or downwards from a 
point on the LL locus produces a labour demand deficit, while points to the left and/or above the locus 
represent situations with labour demand surpluses.    
 
As already emphasised, the effects of a partial increase of WF work through factor price increases, 
represented by the nominal wage rate, W. The labour demand shortage resulting from a partial WF 
increase is due to a relatively stronger joint influence of the wage increase via the positive (i) 
Substitution effects, (ii) Competitiveness effects and (iv) Labour supply effects than via the negative 
(iii) Home market effects. This reflects characteristics of the Spanish economy: While (iv) contributes 
to increase net labour supply through a higher price of leisure, the major explanations are the labour 
demand reductions resulting from (i) and (ii). Though the Armington elasticities are not very high - cf. 
Table A3 - the fact that internationally competing industries are relatively labour intensive 
(particularly metal production contributes to this) cause significant (ii) Competitiveness effects of 
increased WF, and thus wages. The (i) Substitution effects are less easy to track, but the substitution 
elasticities listed in Table A3 indicate rather responsive labour-to-capital rates at the firm level. A real 
wage increase induces both substitution and income effects in favour of increased consumption and 
subsequent, counteracting (iii) Home market effects on labour demand. However, consumer goods are 
relatively capital intensive - and becomes even more so when prices of labour intensive goods increase 
in relativel terms, rendering the Home market effects on labour demand relatively weak. First of all 
consumption of trade services, other manufacturers and renting contribute to the high capital intensity. 
The responding rise in U in order to neutralise this excess labour supply is due to a dominating (v) 
Unemployment wedge effect that causes a direct reduction of excess supply through a drop in the term 
(1-U) in eq.(4). Other mentioned effects of U work in the other direction.10 
 
As illustrated in Figure 3, also the slope of the DD-locus is positive, implying that WF and U work in 
opposite directions on the trade balance. Partially increasing WF rises nominal and real wages and 
                                                     
10  Increased U for given WF, would have to involve increased wages via the indirect welfare function in (6) that contribute to 
reinforce the excess supply of labour through the same mechanisms (i) to (iv) discussed above. Also the independent impacts 
of U in (iii) and (iv) increase net labour supply. Increased U reduces household income and reduces labour demand through 
the (iii) Home market effects, while simultaneously increasing labour supply by reducing leisure demand. In addition, another 
effect of U, which is suppressed in the stylised model exposition, also contributes to reduce excess supply somewhat: 
Increased U reduces the search cost component of the wage rate directly (see eqs. (A38) and (A39)) due to the externalities of 
the matching process (see eqs. (A40) and (A41)). This effect also contributes to the simulated positive slope of the LL-locus 
in Figure 3, but is weak.  
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affects the trade balance adversely both through (vi) Competitiveness effects and (vii) Home market 
effects (vii). An increase in U will help restoring the trade balance restriction. The dominant effect of 
increased U in the Spanish economy is to decrease import leakage through negative Home market 
effects (vii). Consumer goods with high (input-output-adjusted) import shares are first of all metals and 
other manufacturers. The slope of the DD-locus implies that being off and above the DD-locus 
represents situations with smaller deficits than required by the current account restriction, while at 
points below the curve, deficits are too large.  
3. Unemployment and welfare effects of carbon permits 
3.1 Case A: Lumpsum recycling 
In order to wind up the main mechanisms producing the results in Case A, we exploit the stylised 
model presented in Section 2.3. In Figure 3, the equilibrium solution of Case A is marked in the point 
(WFA, UA), which represents the intersection between the loci LLA and DDA. The respective shifts 
from the LL0 and DD0-loci reflect that the ε-vector has changed due to the exogenous restriction on 
CO2 emissions. The direct effect is to impose a price wedge between the consumer and producer price 
of fossil fuels. Figure 3 shows that, relative to the benchmark, both loci shift upwards in the relevant 
area. As explained in Section 2.3, these points are characterised by WFs and Us that, for given ε= ε0, 
would create a labour demand surplus. In other words, the partial effect of moving from ε0 to εA is to 
create a labour demand deficit that has to be neutralised. This deficit is the net result of effects through 
the four main channels for ε-impacts already described in Section 2.3 - confer eq. (4). Lower demand 
follows from the (ii) Competitiveness effects and (iii) Home market effects. The former reflect that 
internalising the costs of emitting deteriorates the competitiveness of domestic firms. The latter are 
consequences of lowered real wages when prices rise. This discourages consumers' demand for goods 
and, thus, firms' demand for labour. Neither the internationally exposed goods, nor the consumer 
goods have very high direct fossil fuel intensities, but as prices of inputs, first of all electricity and 
transport services, increase, the CO2 permit pricing significantly raises the costs within exposed 
industries and final goods industries. Labour supply effects (iv) and Substitution effects(i) contribute to 
weaken, but not offsetting, the labour demand deficit; the first through reducing labour supply, the 
latter through increasing labour demand. Labour supply falls in the wake of higher consumer prices of 
fossil fuels, as well as goods produced by fossil fuels. Substitution effects contribute to increase labour 
demand, as the capital-intensive industries tend to face the highest CO2 permit costs. This causes a 
substitution of relatively labour intensive production for capital intensive. However, as share of total 
capital use, the fossil fuel intensive industries are not very important, so this effect is small. 
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Simultaneously, the DD-locus shifts from DD0  to DDA. As the new (WF,U)-points lie above the DD0 -
locus, we know that their adjustments, in isolation, cause a current account improvement from the 
benchmark (see Section 2.3). For this to balance current account, the CO2-policy reform must have 
caused a corresponding current account reduction. The explanation is that the lumpsum reform affects 
the current account through two main channels (see the ε's in eq. (5)): Increased emission prices imply 
a competitiveness loss that deteriorates the trade balance. This negative (vi) Competitiveness effect 
turns out to dominate the positive (vii) Home market effect caused by reduced import leakage when 
domestic income decreases.  
 
The new intersection point reflects that introducing a CO2 permit reform will not notably affect 
aggregate U. This challenges the frequently expressed concern for accentuated Spanish unemployment 
in the wake of climate policy action. It mirrors that the fossil fuel intensive part of the Spanish 
economy is relatively capital intensive. Thus, from the industries producing or consuming CO2-
intensive products, most notably production of Electricity, Coal, Gas and Water Supply, mainly capital 
is released. But along with it, relatively small amounts of labour, primarily unskilled also leaves these 
industries. The capital is mainly absorbed through substitution of primary factors for fossil fuels in the 
contracting Chemicals, Other Manufacturing11 and Road Transport industries, and through a 
significant expansion of Agriculture. The released labour is mainly re-employed in these same 
industries.  In fact, total employment increases slightly (see Table 2a), reflecting that the negative shift 
in the labour demand caused by Competitiveness effects and Home market effects of the CO2 permit 
prices, is more than offset in the new equilibrium by relative wage reductions that stimulate demand. 
However, as labour supply simultaneously rises, the unemployment rate remains unaltered. The 
disaggregated results reveal that the rise in employment only benefit the unskilled, while employment 
of skilled labour falls marginally.  
 
The simultaneous welfare loss following the factor price reductions amounts to 0.93 percent. This pure 
abatement cost lies in the lower range of those from other European studies (see IPCC, 2001, Bye et 
al., 2002, Bosquet, 2000). One explanation is differences in the employment results: European studies 
usually find that employment drops. This tends to intensify the abatement costs due to significant tax 
interaction effects with existing labour taxes.  
                                                     
11 The Other Manufacturing industry includes the unskilled intensive manufacture of textiles and wood products.  
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3.2 Case B: Recycling through reduced payroll tax rates on all labour 
Adding recycling effects of reduced payroll taxes on all labour to the pure abatement effects in Case A 
corresponds to the more policy-relevant Case B, which is also illustrated in Figure 3. The move from 
(WFA, UA) to (WFB, UB) illustrates that the isolated revenue recycling effects of this scheme are to 
strengthen the employment dividend and to partly offset the welfare loss. In terms of the loci, the 
payroll tax reductions change ε and cause the loci to shift to LLB and DDB, both lying below the 
respective locis of Case A. Thus, cet. par., the WF and U movements would cause a demand deficit in 
the labour market along with an increased current account deficit. Accordingly, as we are in a new 
equilibrium, the recycling scheme has caused the opposite: A labour demand surplus and a current 
account improvement. These are results of counteracting effects that can be tracked by using eqs. (4) 
and (5), as above. In the labour market, (iv) Labour supply effects of the change in ε contribute to 
decrease net demand, as lower payroll tax rates reduces market prices, i.e. raise real wages of 
consumers. However, this effect is inferior to the other three effects (i) -(iii), which all increase labour 
demand and cause excess demand: (i) Substitution effects through lowered labour prices, (ii) 
Competitiveness effects through the subsequent competitiveness improvements, and (iii) Home market 
effects through higher real income and demand. The current account improvement caused by lower 
labour costs is explained by the favourable (vi) Competitiveness effects. (vii) Home market effects 
counteract somewhat through higher import leakage, but turns out to be inferior. 
 
Table 2b shows that the unemployment rate for skilled and unskilled labour falls by 0.33 and 0.20 
percent, respectively, due to the revenue-recycling scheme. This is due to the joint positive impact of 
the Substitution effects, Competitiveness effects and Home market effects on labour demand compared 
to the lumpsum case. The effects are relatively small, as also found in the surveys of Mors (1995), 
Majocchi (1996) and Bosquet (2000).  
 
The recycling effects increase welfare by 0.48 percent. A main reason is that labour taxation leads to 
sub-optimally low levels of labour supply and employment. Cutting the payroll tax rates counteracts 
this distortion. Comparing Case B with Case A reveals that the welfare gain of the revenue recycling 
almost bisects the abatement cost of the CO2 permit system. Such weak double (welfare) dividends of 
labour tax recycling are found in most of the European studies referred to above.  
3.3 Case C: Recycling through reduced VAT rates 
The case of recycling revenue through VAT reductions is also illustrated in Figure 3. As for Case B, 
both loci are shifted downwards compared to the lumpsum case, indicating that the recycling effects 
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generate a labour demand surplus, as well as a current account improvement. However, none of the 
shifts are as strong as in the case of payroll recycling. In the labour market, Substitution effects are of 
much less significance, since VAT also implicitly taxes capital. Home market effects and 
Competitiveness effects still stimulate labour demand and outperform the positive Labour supply 
effects of lower consumer prices. The favourable Competitiveness effects also explain the current 
account improvement. 
 
To counteract the imbalances, factor prices increase in the new equilibrium. The result in terms of WF 
and U is marked in the point (WFC, UC). It reflects that a very weak employment dividend is obtained 
from the VAT recycling, as opposed to the payroll recycling. The employment stimuli caused by the 
Competitiveness effects and Home market effect, as well as the positive Labour supply effects are 
counteracted, and almost offset by factor price increases; see Table 2b. These results indicate that 
unemployment should rather be combated through direct reductions in labour costs. 
 
As reported in Table 2b, the weak double welfare dividend is positive, as also found for other 
countries (see the above mentioned surveys). However, while the literature tends to find that VAT 
recycling is less welfare generating than payroll tax recycling, we find a slightly better welfare result 
in case of VAT recycling. Our study supports the general finding that reducing the VAT rates 
contributes less to cutting the effective labour taxation. This contributes to a relatively weaker welfare 
gain in our study as well as in most others, because consumption increases less relative to leisure, and 
employment of labour increases less (relative to capital). However, other welfare contributions more 
than outweigh this disadvantage of VAT recycling in our study. First, compared to the payroll 
reductions, the VAT reductions leave the consumer prices less distorted; in particular, the difference 
between energy prices and other consumer prices is smaller. Second, the initial VAT taxation on 
domestic output tends to outperform the joint VAT and tariff wedge on imports, implying a distortion 
of resource allocation in disfavour of home-maid products. Thus, the relative price reduction of 
domestic goods resulting from the VAT recycling, results in a welfare-improving increase of Spanish 
market shares at home.  
3.4 Case D: Recycling through reduced payroll tax rates on unskilled labour 
Distributional reasons could call for a revenue recycling policy designed to stimulate unskilled labour, 
in particular, due to the fact that the unemployment rates are twice as high for unskilled as for skilled 
labour. This could also be a case for reaping higher employment dividends than in the case of non-
discriminatory payroll recycling. If the fossil fuel intensive industries use unskilled labour relatively 
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more intensively than skilled labour, a relative subsidy to employment of unskilled workers could help 
to absorb the released labour more efficiently. Also, the relative effect on wage costs of lowering 
payroll taxes will be higher for unskilled labour than for skilled, due to the low wage rates of unskilled 
workers, implying that the change in the wage costs will be larger.  
 
However, our results contradict the hypothesis that employment dividends increase when revenue 
recycling is targeted to the low skilled. We find a much smaller employment dividend in macro in this 
recycling regime than in the non-discriminatory recycling scheme in Case B - see Table 2b. U falls by 
only 0.08 percent as opposed to a reduction of 0.24 percent in Case B, and the increase in aggregate 
employment is also lower. Behind these aggregate results lie significant differences between the two 
skill groups. While the non-discriminatory recycling in Case B gained both groups, exclusively 
recycling revenue through the costs of unskilled labour reduces the unemployment rate for this group, 
only. This is offset by a rise in the unemployment rate of skilled labour. The recycling effects are 
qualitatively illustrated in the market diagrams for unskilled and skilled labour in Figure 4a and 4b. In 
the unskilled market, the isolated effect of reducing payroll taxes is to generate positive Labour supply 
effects through price reductions, as well as positive Competitiveness effects, Home market effects and 
Substitution effects on demand. In particular, the Substitution effects contribute to a significantly 
higher demand for unskilled labour than in Case B. Other cost changes, primarily through factor price 
increases, modify the shifts. The subsequent excess labour demand is neutralised by an increased 
unskilled wage rate and a reduced unemployment rate, and in the new equilibrium, the revenue 
recycling scheme has contributed to increase unskilled labour wages by as much as 4.76 percent, while 
the unemployment rate has fallen by 0.42 percent, reflecting a labour demand increase of 1.10 percent 
and a somewhat weaker labour supply increase of 1.00 percent.  
 
In the market for skilled labour, the shifts are weaker, in particular the demand shift, due to the 
significant counteracting Substitution effects away from skilled labour caused by the cost reductions of 
unskilled labour. Before any adjustments in the wage rate and the unemployment rate of the skilled, 
the labour market unbalance is less serious than in the market for unskilled labour. The equilibrium 
unemployment rate and wage rate for the skilled part of the labour force increase by 0.19 and 0.65 
percent, respectively. The increased unemployment rate mirrors that the Substitution effects are strong 
and contributes to leave skilled labour employment 0.32 percent lower than in the lumpsum case.  
 
The targeted recycling to unskilled labour generates a weak welfare dividend of about the same 
magnitude as does the recycling through all payroll taxes in Case B. This reflects the strong 
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significance of employment effects in generating welfare: Aggregate employment rises to about the 
same extent in the non-discriminatory and discriminatory recycling schemes, and this contributes to 
increase welfare both directly, as employment is sub-optimally low initially, and through decreasing 
the number of unemployed.  
 
Compared to Case B, the employment of unskilled more than doubles. But at the same time the 
employment of skilled labour decreases sharply and leave aggregate employment somewhat lower 
than in Case B. The downward pressure on skilled labour demand is mainly explained by three 
mechanisms: First a general substitution of unskilled for skilled labour will take place in each firm, 
encouraging employment of unskilled at the expense of skilled. In addition, the relatively skilled-
intensive part of the economy (mainly within the service sector) will reduce its ability to attract 
resources as their relative costs increase. This contributes to reduce skilled labour demand in macro. 
 
The third effect comes through the interplay between capital and labour demand. The direct effect of 
subsidising the unskilled labour costs is to reduce relative prices between unskilled and capital much 
stronger than in Case B. In relatively unskilled-intensive and capital-intensive industries, not only a 
substitution between labour types, but also a substitution for capital, takes place. Thus in the 
expanding part of the economy, most prominently within trade and unskilled intensive manufacturing, 
capital demand decreases. The capital must be absorbed elsewhere, and through relative factor price 
adjustments, the contracting, skilled intensive part of the economy is stimulated to absorb capital. 
Subsequently, capital demand increases in spite of output reductions in the high-skilled service sector, 
implying that skilled labour is squeezed both by unskilled labour and by capital. As a result, aggregate 
production and employment falls relative to Case B, and this tends to take place in the relatively 
skilled-intensive part of the economy, primarily within the skilled service sector.   
 
Our results counter the claims that targeting the revenue to the low skilled reduce employment more 
effectively. Like Bosello and Carraro (2001) we find that subsidising costs of both types of labour is 
better than targeting revenue merely to the unskilled. While their results are mainly explained by 
substitutability between the two labour types within the production processes, our findings for Spain 
also point to important effects from changes in the industrial structure, and from the substitution 
between capital and the two labour types both at the firm level and in macro through resource 
reallocations among industries. This leads naturally to the question addressed in the next section of 
whether targeting to skilled labour have more promising employment effects.  
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3.5 Case E: Recycling through reduced payroll tax rates on skilled labour 
Qualitatively, the opposite story as for Case D applies to this case of recycling the revenue exclusively 
through skilled labour costs, and it can be illustrated simply by changing the labels of the Figures 4a 
and 4b. As in Case D, discriminating between labour groups generates strong substitution effects that 
explain most of the differences between the discriminatory and non-discriminatory cases, but here the 
opposite labour demand impulses with respect to skill groups occur. As reflected in Table 2b, wage 
rates for the skilled increase more than for the unskilled, and the unemployment rate falls for the 
skilled, while that of the unskilled increases. The most interesting observation from the analysis of 
Case E is the strong employment dividend obtained in macro. The overall unemployment rate drops by 
0.44 percent, which implies that revenue recycling through skilled payroll tax rates turns out as the 
most recommendable scheme, and noticeably more effective than recycling though the wage costs of 
unskilled labour (Case D). Behind this result lie both a higher labour demand and a lower labour 
supply than in Case D.  
 
The higher labour demand is partly explained by a stronger effect on demand for the subsidised skill 
type in Case E than in Case D, because the tax cut is more substantial when allocated to the relatively 
fewer skilled workers. In addition, higher labour demand is due to a stronger negative impact on the 
disfavoured skill type in Case D than in Case E. We have to revisit the role of the interlinkages 
between the demand for capital and the two labour types, in order to understand this. In both cases of 
discrimination, the less taxed skill type increases its intensity within firms, and industries using it 
relatively intensively increase their share of total production. However, the two recycling schemes 
differ in their effects on capital demand. Compared to the unskilled intensive industries, the skilled 
intensive industries are relatively less capital intensive and the substitution between capital and labour 
smaller. Thus, reducing the payroll tax on skilled labour and thereby increasing relative costs of 
capital in the skilled intensive part of the economy, releases less capital, cet. par., than do a reduction 
of pay roll taxes of unskilled labour. Consequently, when recycling of the revenue is targeted to the 
use of skilled labour, absorbing the released capital within the unskilled-intensive, relatively capital 
intensive, contracting part of the economy is a smoother process than in Case D. Less labour is 
substituted by capital within these industries than within the contracting industries of Case D, 
subsequently the decrease of unskilled labour demand is smaller than that of skilled in the former case. 
 
When recycling is targeted to skilled employment, first of all service industries where high skills are 
required, expand. However, compared to a targeting to unskilled, the contraction of the industries that 
use the relatively disfavoured skill type more intensively (in this case the unskilled) is less 
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pronounced. All in all, production and employment increase compared to the two other, and more 
frequently analysed, cases of pay roll reductions.  
 
Along with a higher aggregate labour demand, the higher employment dividend in Case E than in Case 
D is explained by a lower aggregate labour supply. This is related to a higher labour supply elasticity 
of unskilled workers than of skilled. The wage rate of the non-subsidised skill type - also in real terms 
- falls by about the same magnitude in the two cases. However, the subsequent discourage of the 
skilled labour in Case D is much smaller than that of the unskilled in Case E and contributes to a lower 
aggregate supply in the latter case. The fact that the wage rate of the skilled - also in real terms - 
increases considerably more in Case E, when skilled are favoured, than does the wage rate of the 
unskilled in Case D, modifies the difference in supply between the two cases, but all in all supply turns 
out lower when the relative subsidies are targeted to skilled employment rather than to unskilled.  
 
To sum up, the result of a 0.04 percent points higher employment and 0.03 percent points lower supply 
in aggregate terms in Case E than in Case D explains the considerably lower U. It is, however, worth 
noticing the adverse effects the scheme in Case E has on the distribution of the unemployment burden. 
In all the other cases, the revenue recycling schemes work to reduce the unemployment rate of the 
unskilled. While subsidising unskilled labour produces the greatest difference between the skill groups 
in terms of unemployment, it goes in favour of the relatively low waged and low skilled. Subsidising 
skilled produce the opposite result.  
 
The weak welfare dividend of the recycling scheme is of the same magnitude as in the other pay roll 
reducing schemes. It is worth stressing that the welfare measure does not consider distributional 
concerns.  
3.6 Sensitivity tests 
This section illustrates the sensitivity of the results to some key assumptions. First, we test the 
assumptions of imperfect competition and increasing returns to scale in production against the 
competitive, constant returns to scale case. Then, we test for alternative parameter values within the 
matching function in the labour market. The reported results in Table 3 apply to the sensitivity 
analyses of Case E, i.e. when CO2 emissions are cut by 25 percent and revenue is recycled through pay 
roll taxes on skilled labour. This is the case where the strongest employment dividend was obtained. 
For the other recycling cases, the sensitivities to the tested assumptions do not deviate markedly. 
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Finally, we also comment on a comparison between simple toy models with different wage formation, 
to shed light on the consequences of using a matching model. 
 
Sensitivity to the competition and returns to scale assumptions. We compare the results of assuming 
increasing returns to scale and imperfect competition with the more commonly assumed case of 
constant returns to scale and perfect competition. Table 3 shows that first of all the welfare dividend is 
sensitive to the assumptions on competition and returns to scale. In the case characterised by constant 
returns and perfect competition, the welfare costs of the reform are lower than in the non-competitive 
case. The main reason for this is that scaling down production is not associated with decreasing 
productivity and thus renders GDP and consumption somewhat higher. The effects on employment 
and the employment dividends turn out to be less significant, mainly due to offsetting effects on labour 
demand: The scales of production are less affected due to the absence of scale economies. This 
dampens changes in labour demand. On the other hand, the elasticity of labour demand increases. This 
is due to higher substitution effects when no costs are assumed as fixed, as well as an increase in the 
demand elasticities of goods. 12  
 
Testing the parameters in the matching function. In our test of the sensitivity of our results to different 
estimates concerning the externality parameters in the labour market matching functions (see section 
2.2), we compare the results of Case E, based on values from Burda and Wyplosz (1994), with 
alternative estimates provided in Castillo et al. (1998) (CJL). The vacancy externalities from the two 
studies are approximately the same, 0.14 against 0.15. The main difference lies in their parameter 
estimates for the unemployment externalities. While BW estimate the elasticity to 0.12, Castillo et al. 
(1998) (CJL) find it to be as large as 0.85. The unemployment externality represents the externality 
from workers to firms, and stronger externality effects work through the search cost component of the 
wages. The tests show that the unemployment rates for the two skill types change in opposite 
directions. The change for skilled labour is most prevalent, as the matching is only affected to the 
extent that the unemployment rate deviates from the benchmark; see equation (3). The main driving 
force is a smaller increase in labour demand, as some of the substitution effects in favour of skilled 
labour is offset by the relative wage increase. As the results for unskilled labour have opposite signs, 
the effects in macro on unemployment, the employment dividend, as well as welfare, are weak.    
 
                                                     
12 See Fallon and Verry (1988, pages 83-90) for an analytical demonstration, or McConnell et al. (1999, chapter 5) for an 
economic intuition. 
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Testing different wage formation models. In order to easily calibrate the labour market to alternative 
models, we have chosen to perform a simpler analysis. We study a uniform tax cut on all labour within 
simple, aggregate toy models distinguishable by their wage formation mechanism. In the first, wages 
are fully flexible and eliminate all unemployment. In the second, our matching model is implemented, 
while the third is characterised by rigid wages. We find that decreasing the tax on labour reduces 
employment in all models. Compared to the flexible wage case, the employment increases more with 
the matching function, as unemployment and search costs fall. However, compared to a model with 
full wage rigidity, employment increases less. The reason is that the wage is adjusting in the case of  
matching, even if there are frictions in the labour market.13   
4. Conclusions 
This paper addresses the special challenges of Spain in meeting the international commitments on 
greenhouse gas emissions, while at the same time attend to its severe unemployment problems. Within 
a CGE framework, we model unemployment as a result of the matching process in the labour market, 
which seems to yield a good description of the Spanish labour market. This allows for studying 
welfare and employment dividends of carbon policies in relation, and also for taking into 
consideration the effects on labour supply. The endogeneity of labour supply has lead us to define 
employment dividends in terms of unemployment rates instead of employment, to sort out the effects 
on voluntary choices of leisure. Our qualitative findings do, however, not hinge on this change of 
definition. A special contribution of our work is to account for the substantial differences between the 
markets for unskilled and skilled labour markets in Spain, which enables us to supplement previous 
studies with assessments of policy alternatives directed to one of the labour market segments, only. 
 
We find, in line with most other studies, that a carbon permit market in Spain, combined with revenue 
recycling through payroll tax reductions, increases employment, and leads to unemployment rate 
reductions. Our results are relatively optimistic, as adverse unemployment effects are avoided also in 
case of lumpsum recycling, i.e., when no payroll tax reductions are accounted for. This reflects first of 
all that carbon intensive sectors represent a low share of employment, especially of skilled 
employment, so that the economy is able to absorb the workers through expansion in other, relatively 
labour intensive industries.  
 
                                                     
13 An appendix with more detailed results is available upon request from the authors.  
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The revenue recycling schemes have different potentials for reducing unemployment rates. As Bosello 
and Carraro (2001) find for Europe, pay roll tax reductions seem to yield smallest employment 
dividends when they are targeted to unskilled employment, only. However, a case not analysed by 
Bosello and Carraro (2001) seems to be the most promising, namely reducing payroll taxes 
exclusively for the skilled workers. When the supply effects are taken into account and unemployment 
rates calculated, the employment dividends appear to be quite sensitive to the recycling scheme: While 
using the revenue to lower payroll taxes on unskilled employment reduces the aggregate 
unemployment rate by only 0.08 percent, recycling through skilled payroll taxes reduces the rate by 
0.44 percent. Recycling the revenue to both groups yields an employment dividend in between (-0.24 
percent). The stronger employment dividend from recycling through costs of skilled labour is partly 
the result of a stronger stimulation of labour demand. The cut in costs of the subsidised labour type is 
stronger, as skilled labour constitutes a smaller group. But its interplay with capital is also important:  
Skilled labour tends to work in the least capital intensive part of the economy, implying that increased 
demand for skilled labour causes a modest substitution for capital and a subsequent modest need for 
absorbing capital by crowding out unskilled labour in other parts of the economy. Further, the supply 
response to rising wages is weaker than in the other revenue recycling alternatives, as the labour 
supply elasticity of the skilled workers are higher than that of the unskilled. 
 
This result leaves a dilemma to policy makers due to its distributional implications: In spite of its 
stronger aggregate employment dividend, the recycling scheme will deepen the gap between the two 
skill groups in terms of unemployment rates. The entire employment dividend will come to the 
relatively advantageous and prosperous group of skilled, while the unemployment problem of 
unskilled workers will increase somewhat. On the contrary, reducing taxes on employment of 
unskilled will benefit this group, only. In spite of a barely discernible aggregate employment dividend 
in this case, the scheme can be of interest to policy makers searching a way to generate employment of 
unskilled workers. 
 
We find no trade-off between welfare and unemployment concerns in the choice among revenue 
recycling alternatives. All the analysed schemes produce nearly the same, and positive, welfare 
effects. However, the welfare dividend is weak, i.e., the gains from recycling the revenue cannot offset 
the welfare cost of introducing market prices on CO2 emissions. On the other hand, we do not 
calculate the welfare gain obtained in terms of a better environment and a positive contribution to 
climate stabilisation.  
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It is important to bear in mind that the primary objective of introducing the carbon permit system is to 
reduce emissions. Ideally, other policy aims like reducing unemployment require selective and 
targeted instruments in order to be addressed efficiently. No analyses of the Spanish unemployment 
problem put much emphasis on the payroll tax system as a major contributor to the problems. Our 
conclusions are relevant first of all to the Spanish carbon emission issue and have only minor potential 
as a contribution to the Spanish labour market debate. But still, if green taxes or tradable carbon 
permits are introduced, reducing payroll taxes can be a sensible way of recycling the revenue as this 
gives reduced unemployment rates as a positive side effect. 
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Figures and tables 
Table 1. Classification of sectors 
 Sectors 
1 Agriculture 
2 Coal 
3 Oil 
4 Gas 
5 Electricity 
6 Water and other energy sources 
7 Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 
8 Metal and machinery 
9 Other manufacturing 
10 Construction 
11 Commerce and hotel trade 
12 Road transport 
13 Other transport and communications 
14 Finance and insurance 
15 House renting 
16 Other services 
 
Table 2: The pure abatement effects, and the recycling effects of different schemes 
 Table 2a: Pure abatement effects Table 2b: Recycling effects; 
 % change from benchmark % change from Case A 
 Case A Case B Case C Case D Case E 
       
Unemployment rate skilled 0.01 -0.33 -0.05 0.19 -0.99 
Unemployment rate unskilled -0.02 -0.20 -0.03 -0.42 0.11 
Unemployment rate (agg) 0.00 -0.24 -0.04 -0.08 -0.44 
Employment skilled -0.01 0.54 0.07 -0.32 1.65 
Employment unskilled 0.06 0.51 0.07 1.10 -0.31 
Employment (agg) 0.03 0.52 0.07 0.49 0.53 
Labour supply skilled -0.01 0.50 0.06 -0.30 1.53 
Labour supply unskilled 0.05 0.47 0.06 1.00 -0.27 
Labour supply (agg) 0.03 0.48 0.06 0.48 0.45 
Welfare -0.93 0.48 0.53 0.47 0.48 
market wage rate skilled -2.69 3.04 0.62 0.65 6.21 
market wage rate unskilled -2.49 3.08 0.63 4.76 0.77 
Capital rent -2.40 0.28 0.73 0.22 0.34 
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Table 3: Sensitivity of results in Case E: 25% CO2 abatement and skilled pay roll tax recycling 
 Base Case Sensitivity tests 
 
 
Case E 
CRTS & perfect 
competition 
Constant returns in 
matching function 
     
Unemployment rate skilled -0.98 -1.00 -0.24 
Unemployment rate unskilled 0.09 0.11 0.03 
Unemployment rate (agg) -0.44 -0.45 -0.30 
Employment skilled 1.64 1.68 1.55 
Employment unskilled -0.25 -0.28 -0.23 
Employment (agg) 0.56 0.56 0.53 
Labour supply skilled 1.52 1.56 1.52 
Labour supply unskilled -0.22 -0.26 -0.22 
Labour supply (agg) 0.48 0.47 0.48 
Welfare -0.46 -0.36 -0.47 
market wage rate skilled 3.52 3.96 3.56 
market wage rate unskilled -1.72 -1.53 -1.76 
Capital rent -2.06 -1.95 -2.07 
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Figure 1: Nesting structure for production14 
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Figure 2: Nesting structure for consumption15 
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14 The elasticity of substitution, σ, represents the substitution among components immediately below. 
15 The elasticity of substitution, σ,  represents the substitution among components immediately below. 
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Figure 3: The Labour market loci (LL) and Trade balance loci (DD) in Case 0 (benchmark), 
Case A, Case B and Case C  
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Figure 4: Effects of recycling through payroll tax for unskilled (Case D vs. Case A) 
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Appendix 1 
Notation 
As a general rule, the notation in the model is as follows: endogenous variables are denoted by capital 
letters, exogenous variables by capital letters with a bar, and parameters by small Latin and Greek 
letters. There are n (i,j=1,…,n=16) production sectors, where good n is referred to the public sector 
and there are two subsets: fuel (representing coal, gas and oil) and en (representing electricity, coal, 
gas and oil).  
 
Table A1: Endogenous variables  
Symbol Definition 
Ai Armington aggregate (total amount of goods supplied) of sector I 
CARBON Revenue from carbon permits 
CFi Final domestic consumption of goods produced by sector i 
CO2 fuel
C  CO2 emissions from fuel combustion in final consumption 
Ei Number of firms in sector I 
EXPi Exports of sector I 
FC Conversion factor of foreign currency into domestic currency 
Hs, Hus Inverse of the premium on reservation wages for skilled and un-
skilled labour 
Ii Investment (gross capital formation) in goods produced by sector I 
IIij Intermediate inputs from sector j used by sector i 
IMPi Imports from sector I 
ITi Revenue from tariffs on imports from sector i 
MARKUPi Price-cost margin in sector I 
NITi Revenue from net indirect taxes in sector i 
Oi Production of sector i sold in the domestic market 
Psav Shadow price of savings 
PAi Unit cost of the Armington aggregate of sector i 
PCARB Unit cost of an emission permit 
PDISTi Unit cost of of the distributed production of sector i 
PEi Unit cost of energy of sector I 
PEVAi Unit cost of energy and value added of sector i 
PINV Unit cost of aggregate investment  
PLi Unit cost of labour used in sector i  
PLIQi Unit cost of liquids of sector I 
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Table A1 (cont.): Endogenous variables  
POCi Unit cost of the production of sector i sold in the domestic market. 
It includes the permit price carbon emission for sectors coal, oil 
and gas  
POi Unit cost of the production of sector i sold in the domestic market  
PNELi Unit cost of non-electric energy of sector i 
PVAi Unit cost of primary factors of sector I 
PXi Price of effective production of sector i 
Qc Demand for aggregate consumption 
Qcg Demand for aggregate consumption of goods 
Qfuel Demand for consumption of fuel 
Qen Demand for consumption of good en 
Qocg Demand for other consumption goods 
Ql Demand for leisure 
Ql
s,Ql
us  Leisure associated to skilled and unskilled labour  
Qsav Demand for savings 
R Capital rent 
SOCCEi Revenue from social contributions payed by employers of sector I 
SOCCWi Revenue from social contributions payed by              employees of 
sector i 
Us, Uus Unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled labour 
Ws, Wus  Wages of skilled and unskilled labour 
W0s, W0us Reservation wages of skilled and unskilled labour 
WF Welfare 
Xi Effective production of sector i 
YRC Disposable income of the representative consumer 
κid Perceived elasticity of demand in sector i 
ΠiA Unit profits for Ai (according to origin) 
ΠiCET Unit profits for Ai (according to destination) 
ΠiX Unit profits for Xi 
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Table A2: Exogenous variables and parameters 
Symbol Definition 
BALPUB  Balance of the public sector  
D  Trade balance surplus 
CFn  Consumption of the public sector 
INVPUB  Investment of the public sector 
INVTOTAL  Total investment of the economy 
KRC ,KG  Capital endowment for the representative consumer and public 
sector 
KFi  Fixed requirements of capital in sector I 
Ls,Lus  Endowments of skilled and unskilled labour 
LFi
s,LFi
us  Fixed requirements of skilled and unskilled labour in sector i 
NTPS  Net transfers from the public sector, received by the representative 
consumer 
PFX  World prices 
SAVPUB  Savings of the public sector 
TOTCO2  Initial level of CO2 emissions 
U s,U us  Unemployment rates of skilled and unskilled labour in the base 
year 
Xi  Effective production of sector i in the base year 
YG  Public sector income 
a1i ,…,a6i, b1,b2, b3i, c0i, 
cji, di, ei, gfuel, hfuel 
Share parameters  
iti Ad valorem tariff rates in sector I 
niti Ad valorem indirect taxes rates in sector I 
soccwsi, soccwusi Ad valorem social contributions rates paid by            employees in 
sector I 
soccesi, socceusi Ad valorem social contributions rates paid by            employers in 
sector I 
Ωi Conjectural variations parameter in sector I 
α1i,...,α6i, ζi Scale parameters  
εi Elasticity of transformation in sector I 
η0,η1 Externalities from labour supply and unemployment 
θ Factor of abatement 
σiA Armington elasticity of substitution in sector I 
σCL Elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure 
σiELK Elasticity of substitution between energy inputs, labour and capital 
in sector I 
σiLK Elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in sector I 
τi,τsav Share parameters 
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Appendix 2 
Equations 
We present the complete set of equations included in the model. The general equilibrium model is 
solved as a mixed complementarity problem (see Mathiesen, 1985). Hence, it involves four sets of 
equations: zero profit conditions, market clearing equations in good and factor markets, budget 
constraints, and some additional constraints. The model core is a basic Arrow-Debreu model extended 
with some constraints and assumptions.  
A2.1. Production 
The base model presents increasing returns to scale due to some fixed costs, and a non-competitive 
pricing rule. Given that the upper nest is a Leontief function, the zero profit condition for each sector i 
is: (i=1,…,16): 
 
(A1) Π iX = PXi −
RKFi +W s LFi s + W usLFi us( )Ei
Xi
−c0iPEVAi − c jiPOj
j=1
n(n≠ en)∑ = 0 
 
According to the nested structure, there is a sequence of CES nests that defines the unit cost for the 
composite of energy and value added (PEVAi). This nested sequence is (i=1,…,16): 
 
 PEVAi = 1α1i a1i
σ iELK PE i
1−σ iELK + (1− a1i)σ iELK PVAi1−σ i
ELK( ) 11−σ iELK  
 
 PVAi = 1α2i a2 i
σ iLK PLi
1−σ iLK + (1− a2i)σ iLK R1−σ iLK( ) 11−σ iLK  
 
 PLi = 1α3i
W s 1+ socceis + soccwis( )
a3i
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ⎟ 
a3 i W us 1+ socceius + soccwius( )
1− a3i
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ⎟ 
1−a 3 i
 
 
 PEi = 1α4 i a4 i
0.1PNELi
1−0.1 + (1− a4 i)0.1POelec1−0.1( ) 11−0.1 
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 PNELi = 1α5 i a5i
0.5 POCcoal
1−0.5 + (1− a5i)0.5 PLIQi1− 0.5( ) 11−0.5  
 
 PLIQi = 1α6i a6i
2 POCoil
1− 2 + (1− a6 i)2 POCgas1−2( )11− 2  
 
 POCfuel = gfuel  POfuel + 1− gfuel( )PCARB ,  fuel=coal, oil, gas 
 
We assume that the domestic producers maximize profits and select the optimal mix of domestic 
production and imports. They also maximize profits when deciding the share that is going to be sold in 
the domestic market and the share that is going to be exported. Both facts entails two zero profits 
functions (i=1,…,16): 
 
(A2) Π iA = PAi − eiσ iA PXi 1+ niti( )( ) i1−σ iA + (1− ei)σ iA PFXFC 1+ iti( )( )1−σ iA( ) 11−σ iA = 0 
 
(A3) Π iCET = PAi − 1ζ I di
−ε i POi
ε i +1 + (1− di)−ε i PFXFC( )ε i +1( ) 1ε i +1 = 0  
 
The previous zero profit conditions are used to derive demand functions. If we apply Shepard’s 
Lemma on cost functions, we get unitary derived demands. 
 
Next we introduce the corresponding market clearing equations. The left-hand side represents the 
demands, and right-hand side are supplies for all the markets included in the foregoing zero profit 
conditions (i,j=1,…,16): 
 
(A4) Xi − ∂Π i
X
∂POj
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ⎟ = II ji  
 
(A5) EiKFi
i=1
n∑ + Xi −∂Π iX∂R
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ = KRC + KG  
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(A6) EiLFi
s
i=1
n∑ + Xi −∂Π iX∂W s
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ = Ls − Qls( )1−U s( ) 
 
(A7) EiLFi
us
i=1
n∑ + Xi − ∂Π iX∂W us
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ = Lus −Qlus( )1−U us( ) 
 
(A8) Ai − ∂Π i
A
∂PX i
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = Xi  
 
(A9) Ai − ∂Π i
A
∂FCi
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = IMPi  
 
(A10) Ai −∂Π i
CET
∂POi
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = Oi  
 
(A11) Ai −∂Π i
CET
∂FCi
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ = EXPi  
 
(A12) Xi + IMPi = Oi + EXPi  
 
(A13) Ii + IIij
j=1
n∑ + CFi = Oi  
 
The markup function to cover fixed costs is (i=1,…,16): 
 
(A14) MARKUPi =
PX i −c0iPEVAi − c jiPOj
j=1
n(n≠ en)∑
PXi
 
 
Which corresponds to the Lerner index: 
 
(A15) MARKUPi = ΩiEiκ id  
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And: 
 
(A16) κ id = σ iA − σ iA −1( ) PXiXi
PXiXi
i=1
n∑
 
A2.2. Consumption 
The final demand functions are derived from the maximization of the representative consumer’s 
nested welfare function (see Figure 2): 
 
(A17) WF = Qc( )1−τ sav Qsav( )τ sav  
 
subject to the budget constraints: 
 
(A18) YRC =W s Ls −Qls( )1−U s( )+ W us Lus − Qlus( )1−U us( )+ RKRC + NTPS  
 
(A19) YRC = Psav Qsav + POiCFi
i=1
n∑ + PCARB CO2 fuelC
fuel
∑  
 
where the nests in the welfare function are defined by: 
 
(A20) Qc = b1σ CL Qcg1−σ CL + (1− b1)σ CL Ql1−σ
CL( ) 11−σ CL  
 
(A21) Ql = b20.5Qls1− 0.5 + (1− b2)0.5 Qlus1− 0.5( ) 11− 0.5  
 
(A22) Qcg = b3en0.1Qen1− 0.1 + b3elec0.1 Qelec1−0.1 + b3ocg0.1 Qocg1−0.1( ) 11−0.1 
 
(A23) Qen = Qcoal( )τ coal Qoil( )τ oil Qgas( )τ gas  
 
(A24) Qfuel = CFfuelh fuel ,
CO2 fuel
C
1− hfuel
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ ⎟ , 
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(A25) Qocg = CFiτ i
i=1
n−1∏ ,      i ≠ elec,coal,oil,gas 
 
The resolution of the maximization problem yields demand functions for savings (Qsav ), leisure for 
skilled labour (Qsl), leisure for unskilled labour (Qusl), final demand (CFi) and carbon permits demand 
(CO2 fuel
C ) that enter in equations (A37), (A6), (A7), (A13) and (A31), respectively. 
A2.3. Public sector 
The role of the public sector is to set and collect taxes. The income of this sector is: 
 
(A26) YG = RKG + SOCCEi + SOCCWi( )
i=1
n∑ + NITi + ITi( )
i=1
n∑ + CARBON − NTPS  
 
where the public revenue comes from: 
 
(A27) SOCCEi = socceiW s Xi −∂Π i
X
∂W s
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ + socceiW
usXi − ∂Π i
X
∂W us
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟  
 
(A28) SOCCWi = soccwiW sXi −∂Π i
X
∂W s
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ + soccwiW
usXi −∂Π i
X
∂W us
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟  
 
(A29) NITi = PDISTiAi − ∂Π i
A
∂PDISTi
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ niti  
 
(A30) ITi = PFX FC Ai − ∂Π i
A
∂FCi
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ iti  
 
Moreover, the public sector can control CO2 emissions through emission permits, where emissions 
come from production and consumption activities. The public sector can constrain the total level of 
emissions (TOTCO2 ) through a factor of abatement (θ), which is equal to 1 in the benchmark. For 
example, a reduction in CO2 emissions (i.e., reduction in the number of permits) of 25% means that θ 
is equal to 0.75. The next equation represents this mechanism: 
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(A31) θ  TOTCO2 = Xi − ∂Π i
X
∂PCARB
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ + CO2 fuelC
i=1
n∑ ,     fuel=carbon,oil,gas 
 
The public revenue accruing from the auction of permits/carbon taxation is: 
 
(A32) CARBON = Xi − ∂Π i
X
∂PCARB
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ PCARB + CO2 fuelC PCARB
fuel
∑ ,   fuel=carbon,oil,gas 
 
Due to the assumption of neutrality regarding public sector activity, the macro closure rules are: 
 
(A33) BALPUB = SAVPUB − INVPUB  
 
(A34) CFn = YG − SAVPUB  
A2.4. Investment, savings and foreign sector 
The macro closures involve some other constraints related to investment (equation (A35)) and the 
savings in the open economy (equations (A36) and (A37)): 
 
(A35) POiIi
i=1
n∑  = PINV INVTOTAL  
 
(A36) DIMPPFXEXPPFX i
n
i
i
n
i
=− ∑∑
==
  
11
 
 
(A37) PsavQsav + SAVPUB − PINV  INVTOTAL = D  FC  
A2.5. Factor markets 
The equilibrium in the capital market is represented by equation (A5). The market clearing conditions 
in labour markets are (A6) and (A7) with some restrictions related to the matching unemployment 
assumptions: 
 
(A38) W s =W0s 1H s   
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(A39) W us = W0us 1H us  
 
(A40) H s = 1−U s( )
Xi −∂Π i
X
∂W s
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑
Xi −∂Π i
X
∂W s
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ 
η 0
U s
U s
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
η 1
 
 
(A41) H us = 1−U us( )
Xi − ∂Π i
X
∂W us
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑
Xi − ∂Π i
X
∂W us
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ ⎟ 
η 0
U us
U us
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ 
η 1
 
A2.6. Perfect competition 
Assuming constant returns to scale (CRTS), the core of the model remains (production functions are 
defined in Figure 1). Nevertheless, some equations are replaced when the model is changed from the 
non-competitive version to the competitive one. The zero profit equation (A1’) replaces equation (A1) 
(i=1,…,16): 
 
(A1’) Π iX = PXi −c0iPEVAi − c jiPOj
j =1
n(n≠ en)∑ = 0,    i=1,…,16 
 
In the CRTS version, there are no fixed costs of primary factors, and we must replace market-clearing 
conditions (A5) to (A7) by: 
 
(A5’) Xi −∂Π i
X
∂R
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ = KRC + KG  
 
(A6’) Xi −∂Π i
X
∂W s
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ = Ls − Qls( )1−U s( ) 
 
(A7’) Xi − ∂Π i
X
∂W us
⎛ 
⎝ ⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ ⎟ i=1
n∑ = Lus − Qlus( )1−U us( ) 
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Appendix 3  
Calibration and data 
The model has been calibrated using the Spanish Social Accounting Matrix for 1990 MCS-90 
developed in Uriel et al. (1997) and Gómez-Plana (2001). The matrix represents the benchmark 
equilibrium of the model. Calibration is made in three steps. In the first step, the matrix collects the 
quantities appearing in the equations, that means a first reference point in the isoquant of the calibrated 
function. In the second step, relative prices in 1990 fix the slope of the isoquant in that point. Since 
matrix data do not distinguish between prices and quantities, only showing values, we follow 
Harberger's (1972) assumption and choose the quantity units for goods and factors so that prices are 
unitary. The last step in the calibration uses elasticities, which show the curvature of the isoquant. To 
sum up, we have the slope and curvature for a point in each isoquant, and from there, all the unknown 
parameters are calibrated using Rutherford's (1999) method. 
 
Elasticities pay a key role in this model due to the calibration method applied. Therefore a careful 
research for the benchmark values has been performed. The nested structure of the production 
technology (see Section 2.2) follows Rutherford and Paltsev’s (2000) CGE model, with some 
additional information (see Table A3): elasticities of substitution between labour and capital σ iLK , as 
well as Armington elasticities σ iA  are taken from GTAP (Hertel, 1997). The available evidence shows 
quite different figures for elasticities of substitution between skilled and unskilled labour σ iLL , which 
may range from more than 5 to (small) negative values; see Hamermesh (1993), Chapter 3. The 
simulations have been performed using a “low” value of 1, which would agree with the recent 
estimates of Biscourp and Gianella (2001) for French manufacturing. Elasticities of substitution 
between energy and value added σ iE−LK  for manufactures are taken from Kemfert and Welsch (2000). 
Finally, elasticities of transformation εI  come from de Melo and Tarr (1992). 
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Table A3: Elasticities and Herfindahl indexes16 
 SECTORS σ iLK  σ iA  εi σ iE−LK  1/Ei 
1 Agriculture 0.56 2.2 3.9 0.5 0,00154 
2 Coal 1.12 2.8 2.9 0.5 0,06716 
3 Oil 1.12 2.8 2.9 0.5 0,32994 
4 Gas 1.12 2.8 2.9 0.5 0,08997 
5 Electricity 1.26 2.8 2.9 0.5 0,08997 
6 Water and other energy sources 1.26 2.8 2.9 0.5 0,05095 
7 Nonenergy minerals, chemicals 1.26 1.9 2.9 0.96 0,03533 
8 Metal and machinery 1.26 2.8 2.9 0.88 0,04666 
9 Other manufacturing 1.26 2.8 2.9 0.70 0,01404 
10 Construction 1.40 1.9 0.7 0.5 0,00572 
11 Commerce and hotel trade 1.68 1.9 0.7 0.5 0,01790 
12 Road transport 1.68 1.9 0.7 0.5 0,00637 
13 Other transport and communications 1.68 1.9 0.7 0.5 0,33973 
14 Finance and insurance 1.26 1.9 0.7 0.5 0,03855 
15 House renting 1.26 1.9 0.7 0.5 0,00127 
16 Other services 1.26 1.9 0.7 0.5 0,00799 
 
 
The elasticities of substitution for consumption also follow Rutherford and Paltsev (2000) with some 
additions and changes. The elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption  σhLQ  has been 
obtained using the procedure of Ballard et al. (1985), from the uncompensated elasticity of labour 
supply estimated in García and Molina (1998)17. A total of 40 hours worked per week, out of a 
potential 70, has been assumed. We have no data available on the elasticities of substitution between 
leisure for the skilled and leisure for the unskilled σhLEI , so we assume they take a constant value 
across households of 0.5. 
                                                     
16 σ iLK  and σ iA : Hertel (1997). 
i: de Melo and Tarr (1992). 
σ iE−LK : Kemfert and Welsch (2000) and Rutherford and Paltsev (2000). 
1/EI: Elaborated from Bajo and Salas (1998). 
17 They estimate the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the own wage, for both men and women, from different 
functional forms. Since they find no evidence against the null hypothesis that these elasticities are zero, we use this value as 
starting point when computing σhLQ . 
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Table A4: Consumption of fuels18 
 SECTORS COAL OIL GAS ELECTRICITY TOTAL 
1 Agriculture   0.01   1.37   0.03   0.3    1.72 
2 Coal19   0.76   0   0   0    0.76 
3 Oil20   0   4.20   0   0.17    4.37 
4 Gas21   0.01   0.06   0.1022   0    0.17 
5 Electricity23  14.11   2.18   0.27   1.9624  18.52 
6 Water and other energy sources   0   0   0   0   0 
7 Non-energy minerals, chemicals25   3.79   6.98   2.38   3.15  16.30 
8 Metal and machinery26   0.09   0.31   0.35   0.63   1.38 
9 Other manufacturing27   0.45   1.58   1.01   1.59   4.63 
10 Construction   0   0.05   0   0.07   0.11 
11 Commerce and hotel trade28   0.01   0.47   0.08   0.96   1.53 
12 Road transport   0  18.05   0   0  18.05 
13 Other transport & communications29   0   4.47   0   0.32   4.78 
14 Finance and insurance11   0.00   0.26   0.05   0.52   0.83 
15 House renting   0   0   0   0   0 
16 Other services11   0.01   0.33   0.06   0.67   1.07 
 Final consumption by households30   0.28   3.65   0.64   2.60   7.17 
Source: Energy Balances of OECD Countries 1990-1991, OECD, Paris, 1993. 
 
Benchmark emission levels are calibrated in the CGE model in the usual way (i.e., Bernstein et al., 
1999). IEA (1993a) provides data on consumption of fuels. We aggregate according to sectors and 
types of fuels displayed in our model (see Table A4). Then, we transform all variables in a common 
unity, EJ (displayed in Table A5), using Spanish specific conversion factors (see IEA, 1993b). Finally, 
                                                     
18 Units: Million metric tons of oil equivalent. Non-energy use is not included. 
19 In table: Coal transformation + Own use 
20 In table: Petroleum Refineries (Crude oil – petroleum products) + Own use + Distribution losses 
21 In table: Gas Works 
22 In table: Own use + Distribution losses – gas produces (gas works) 
23 In table: Public electricity + CHP + Autoproducers of Electricity + CHP 
24 In table: Own use + Distribution losses 
25 In table: Iron and Steel + Non-ferrous Metals + Chemicals and Petrochemical + Non-metallic Minerals + Mining and 
Quarrying 
26 In table: Transport equipment + Machinery  
27 In table: Food and Tobacco + Paper, Pulp and Printing + Wood and Wood Products + Textile and Leather + Non specified  
28 In table: Commerce and Public Services divided according to SAM weights based on production. 
29 In table: Air + Rail + Internal Navigation 
30 In table: Residental 
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we find CO2 emissions at sectoral level by multiplying fuels consumption in EJ by emission 
coefficients. Emission coefficients, transforming from EJ to mt. of CO2, for coal (0.024), gas (0.0137) 
and oil (0.0181) are taken from Rutherford and Paltsev (2000). 
 
Table A5: Consumption of fuels in EJ 
  SECTORS COAL OIL GAS TOTAL 
1 Agriculture 0,0004168 0,0571016 0,0012504 0,0587688 
2 Coal 0,0316768 0,0000000 0,0000000 0,0316768 
3 Oil 0,0000000 0,1750560 0,0000000 0,1750560 
4 Gas 0,0004168 0,0025008 0,0041680 0,0070856 
5 Electricity 0,5881048 0,0908624 0,0112536 0,6902208 
6 Water and other energy sources 0,0000000 0,0000000 0,0000000 0,0000000 
7 Non-energy minerals, chemicals 0,1579672 0,2909264 0,0991984 0,5480920 
8 Metal and machinery 0,0037512 0,0129208 0,0145880 0,0312600 
9 Other manufacturing 0,0187560 0,0658544 0,0420968 0,1267072 
10 Construction 0,0000000 0,0020840 0,0000000 0,0020840 
11 Commerce and hotel trade 0,0004168 0,0195896 0,0033344 0,0233408 
12 Road transport 0,0000000 0,7523240 0,0000000 0,7523240 
13 Other transport & communications 0,0000000 0,1863096 0,0000000 0,1863096 
14 Finance and insurance 0,0000000 0,0108368 0,0020840 0,0129208 
15 House renting 0,0000000 0,0000000 0,0000000 0,0000000 
16 Other service 0,0004168 0,0137544 0,0025008 0,0166720 
  Final consumption by households 0,0116704 0,1521320 0,0266752 0,1904776 
  Total 0,8135936 1,8322528 0,2071496 2,8529960 
 
The specification of the search costs requires values for two externalities. When it comes to matching 
functions, we have some evidence for Spain in Burda and Wyplosz (1994) and Castillo et al. (1998). 
The first study proves the no existence of constant returns to scale in the matching function and its 
estimations yields a value of 0.14 for η0 , and of 0.12 for η1. On the other hand, Castillo et al. (1998) 
provide a value of 0.15 for η0 , and 0.85 for η1. In the reference scenario, we use the values from the 
first study. However, the other values are used in a sensitivity analysis. 
 
The data on imperfect competition are taken from Bajo and Salas (1998), who compute concentration 
indices using data on sales for more than two million Spanish firms, obtained from official VAT 
returns. Firms include all sectors, and not only manufactures as they are commonly estimated in 
literature. The indexes are displayed in Table A3. 
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